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During the energy crisis of the 1970s, consumers were responsible for
energy conservation; today, a large part of the burden has shifted to the utility.
Common energy saving schemes have proven inadequate, prompting state
regulators to introduce demand-side management (DSM) incentives which
reward either expenditures, savings, or net-benefits. DSM benefts are intended
to induce investor-owned electric utilities to promote energy conservation
aggressively. Stoft and Gilbert discuss the difficulties of estimating the net
social benefit of an incentive program and examine how information influences
regulators to select a particular incentive. Currently, most net-benefit incen-
tives, while offering significant expected total rewards.for utility conservation
activities, provide only a weak incentive fir conservation. This Article describes
how these DSM programs can be tailored to achieve greater energy conserva-
tion.
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Conservation Incentives
Introduction
From their inception, electric utilities have attempted to influence the
demand for electricity. Until the energy crisis of the 1970s, this "demand-side
management (DSM)" was almost exclusively of the load-building variety, such
as convincing home owners to replace gas stoves with electric ones. Since then,
demand-side management has become almost synonymous with utility-run
energy conservation programs. The use of DSM conservation programs, which
peaked in the early 1980s, declined at the end of the decade because regulators
were disenchanted with utility performance and because the utilities resisted
the programs outright. As these programs declined, shareholder incentives
designed to improve utility DSM performance rapidly gained popularity among
conservationists and utility regulators.
In July 1989, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
adopted a resolution urging state commissions to "adopt appropriate ratemaking
mechanisms to encourage utilities to help their customers improve end-use
efficiency cost-effectively . . . ."' Prior to this resolution only three utilities
had adopted incentive mechanisms.2 After the resolution was adopted, three
utilities received approval for incentive mechanisms in 1989, and fourteen more
received approval in 1990.3 As of October 1991, eleven states had approved
DSM incentive programs, an additional four states had approved at least a
generic form of incentives, and an additional six states were considering incen-
tives.'
Incentive programs have been growing in size as well as number. Expendi-
tures on utility DSM incentive programs are estimated at almost one billion
dollars in 1992.- This figure represents approximately one-half to two-thirds
of the total amount of expenditures on utility DSM programs since their
inception. One billion dollars is a considerable sum, even though it is only a
small fraction of total utility expenditures. The incentive payments to utilities
I. David Moskovitz, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. Profits and Progress
Through Least-Cost Planning 57 (1989).
2. In 1987 Wisconsin Electric became eligible for a DSM incentive. STEVEN M. NADEL ET AL.,
REGULATORY INCENTIVES FOR DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT 36 (1992). Long Island Lighting Company
gained approval on January 4, 1989. BARAKAT & CHAMBERLIN INC., UTILITY DSM SHAREHOLDER
INCENTIVE STUDY (1991).
3. BARAKAT & CHAMBERLIN, INC., supra note 2.
4. Table I in Appendix A shows utility expenditures on conservation incentive programs and the
incentive payments at 22 utilities originally surveyed by Barakat and Chamberlin in 1991 and subsequently
updated. They represent most (if the utility incentive programs in effect as of June 1992.
5. Table I in Appendix A reports total 1992 incentive program expenditures of $880 million. Estimates
of all 1992 utility DSM expenditures range from $1.3 billion to over $2 billion. See also John H. Chamber-
lin & Ahmad Faruqui, Demand-Side Management: the Next Generation (Sept. 1991) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with authors) (estimating total 1990 DSM expenditures at $2 billion); Lawrence Prete et al.,
Electric Utility Demand-Side Management in ELEC. POWER MONTHLY, April 1992, at 19; ERIC HIRST, OAK
RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, ELECTRIC UTILITY DSM PROGRAMS: 1990 DATA AND FORECASTS TO 2000
(1992) (estimating 1990 DSM expenditures at $1.2 billion with an expected growth rate of 5% per year).
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in these programs have averaged about fifteen percent of program expenditures.
That is, for each dollar that utilities have spent on these programs, they have
been paid on average $1.15. The incentive payment has varied widely between
programs, however, ranging from only $.01 on each dollar to about $.30. In
one case, the incentive payment amounted to as much as $.75 on the dollar,
but only on expenditures of less than one million dollars.
This Article examines incentive programs at nine utilities and places them
into three general categories: markup, bonus, and shared savings. A shared-
savings incentive rewards the utility based on the net benefit of its programs,
typically paying fifteen percent of net benefit. Markup incentives reward the
utility in proportion to its expenditure. The bonus incentive mechanism rewards
a utility on the basis of kilowatt hours saved and is generally an inferior version
of the shared-savings mechanism. We conclude that just two of these categories,
markup and shared savings, are adequate to provide efficient incentives. In
addition, we find that a shared-savings incentive scheme with a very high
marginal incentive rate should be the principle form of incentive program.6
Many of the complexities of existing incentive mechanisms are unnecessary and
even detrimental. High marginal incentives, the ability to measure net benefit,
and simple incentive schemes are the keys to the success of conservation
programs in general and to the shared-savings incentives in particular.
Part I briefly reviews the standard arguments for and against intervention
on the demand side and examines regulatory incentives which encourage
improved utility intervention in that market. Our intent is not to resolve these
controversies, but rather to provide a context for examining the programs that
are reviewed in subsequent parts of the article. In Part II, we classify incentive
mechanisms into the three basic types described above. This Part is supported
by two appendices: Appendix A describes thirteen incentive programs, and
Appendix B examines and comments on the unnecessary complexities of four
specific programs. Part III provides an economic definition of net benefit and
reviews some frequently overlooked elements of conservation costs and bene-
fits. Part IV reviews the economic determinants of efficient conservation
incentives and contrasts these efficient schemes with some currently used
mechanisms.
I. On the Value of Conservation and the Need for Incentives
Although the presence of DSM incentives is well-established, the reasons
for their existence should be reviewed. In order to design effective incentives,
one must understand why intervention on the demand side of the energy market
6. Our analysis assumes the existence of unbiased estimates of savings. Although the estimates may
be highly uncertain, no form of incentive will be efficient without unbiased estimates.
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can be useful and why utilities might need financial incentives to induce them
to intervene efficiently.
A. Are Utility Conservation Programs Needed?
Debate over the value of utility conservation programs has long raged in
the halls of regulatory commissions. Conservation proponents have argued that
energy can be saved more cheaply than it can be produced and that traditional
regulation provides inadequate incentives for investment in conservation. Amory
Lovins coined the term "negawatt" to describe a unit of saved energy, presum-
ably to give conservation a term analogous to that accorded the kilowatts
generated by utilities.7 Exhorting the potential for conservation, Fickett,
Gellings and Lovins claim that opportunities for economic conservation are so
vast that conservation "is not a free lunch; it is a lunch you are paid to eat. '
Other evaluations of conservation opportunities have reached more somber
conclusions about costs but have nonetheless maintained that utilities can
deliver the equivalent of thousands of megawatts of cheap power by increasing
the efficiency with which energy is consumed. 9
Many economists, schooled in the principle of the rational consumer, have
resisted claims that consumers overlook financially attractive opportunities for
more efficient energy use.' Some argue that conservation advocates have
ignored significant components of the costs of conservation alternatives," and
that conservation alternatives have not performed as well in practice as support-
ers have predicted.
2
Assertions by those on both sides of the conservation debate obscure the
fundamental fact that end-use efficiency embraces a wide range of activities
with vastly different market characteristics. Consumers may be able to evaluate
the costs and benefits of some conservation activities, such as the choice of a
new appliance, when its operating costs are clearly labelled. In other circum-
stances, however, consumers may possess imperfect information about the
potential for energy savings and might benefit from intervention by an informed
utility. One example of such intervention is utility-provided education programs
about the net savings from insulation. Even in circumstances in which the value
7. Amory Lovins, Saving Gigabucks with Negawatts, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 21, 1985, at 67.
8. Arnold P. Fickett et al., Efficient Use of Electricity, S¢1. AM., Sept. 1990, at 67.
9. Jonathan G. Koomey et al., The Potential For Electricity Efficiency Improvements in The U.S.
Residential Sector (July 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
10. Ronald J. Sutherland, MarketBarriers to Energy Efficient Investments, 12 ENERGY J. 15, 19 (1991).
I1. Larry E. Ruff, Least Cost Planning and Demand-Side Management: Six Common Fallacies and
One Simple Truth, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 28, 1988, at 19 [hereinafter Ruff, Least Cost Planning]; Larry
E. Ruff, Planning and Pricing in the Energy Conservation Business (June 1992) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with authors) [hereinafter Ruff, Planning and Pricingl.
12. Paul L. Joskow & Donald B. Matron, What Does a Negawatt Really Cost?, ENERGY J., Oct. 1992
at 41.
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of energy conservation is known, consumers may under-invest because they are
constrained in their ability to borrow or because there are economies of scale
in the provision of conservation that can only be exploited by a regulated
provider. For example, John M. Quigley finds that pilot light management
programs are highly cost-effective. 13 The local gas utility can offer such a
program and spread the cost over a significant population, whereas individual
consumers may encounter set-up costs in managing their own pilot lights. The
success of actual programs similar to these examples indicates that utilities can
intervene beneficially in some areas of the energy efficiency market. 4
B. The Arguments for Incentives
While some economists have promoted the cost-effectiveness of conserva-
tion investments, others have argued that traditional regulation cannot provide
incentives for conservation that are comparable to incentives for investment in
energy generation.' 5 The claims against conservation's cost-effectiveness find
some support in the traditional Averch-Johnson model (A-J model) of public
utility regulation. The A-J model shows that rate of return regulation rewards
over-investing when the utility's allowed rate of return exceeds its cost of
capital. 6 In this case, conservation would make the utility worse off by reduc-
ing sales and consequently limiting the investment in energy generation upon
which the utility could earn an excess return. Since traditional regulation does
not recognize DSM programs as a form of investment, DSM causes the utility
a net loss in profit.
Moskovitz offers another view of regulatory disincentives for investments
in conservation. He focuses on the lost revenue effect. 7 This effect is caused
by the fact that regulators set prices which are fixed in the short run and
typically exceed the utility's marginal cost of service. As a result, the utility
has a short-run financial incentive to increase production because each kilowatt-
hour sold makes a positive contribution to profit. Every kilowatt-hour success-
13. John M. Quigley, Residential Energy Conservation: Standards, Subsidies, and Public Programs,
in REGULATORY CHOICES: A PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT IN ENERGY POLICY 290 (Richard Gilbert ed.,
1991).
14. Kenneth E. Train, The Economic Value of Energy-Saving Investments by Commercial and Industrial
Firms, 12 ENERGY 543 (1987) [hereinafter Train, The Economic Value]; Kenneth E. Train, Incentives for
Energy Conservation in Commercial and Industrial Sectors, 9 ENERGY J. 113 (1988) [hereinafter Train,
Incentives for Energy].
15. Ralph C. Cavanaugh, Responsible Power Marketing in an Increasingly Competitive Era, 5 YALE
J. ON REG. 331 (1988); Chris J. Calwell & Ralph C. Cavanaugh, The Decline of Conservation at California
Utilities: Causes, Costs and Remedies (July 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
16. This overinvesting is not a useless exercise. Rather it is simply an excessive substitution of capital
for other inputs which it) not earn a rate of return. See KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPTIMAL REGULATION 35-60
(1991).
17. MOSK VITZ. supra note I.
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fully conserved between program implementation and the next rate case'R costs
the utility approximately five cents. 9 Thus, for Moskovitz and many others,
conservation could be an opportunity for profitable investments but, under
traditional regulation, it remains an opportunity that is systematically under-
rewarded. 2°
Ruff and others have argued that energy conservation does not warrant
regulation because consumers conserve optimally in response to the price of
electricity.2' However, if there are economic opportunities for utility conserva-
tion,22 Moskovitz's argument provides a justification for pro-conservation
regulatory incentives to counteract the anti-conservation incentives inherent in
traditional rate-making. Without this, utilities will rationally work to produce
DSM programs that appear to succeed while actually accomplishing little. This
motivation, coupled with imperfect information on the part of the regulator,
makes a well-structured incentive program necessary for efficient conservation.
The goal of regulation should be to identify and select those opportunities
where the expected benefits from conservation exceed the social costs and to
exclude all others. Much of the debate over the benefits and costs of conserva-
tion incentives fails to recognize that there is no standard conservation oppor-
tunity and that individual conservation programs have shown a wide range of
cost-benefit ratios.23 The purpose of this Article is neither to analyze the
validity of perceptions about the benefits of conservation programs nor to
examine the causes of market failure. Rather, we compare the incentive mecha-
nisms currently in place and evaluate them as case studies in incentive mecha-
nism design. Since incentive programs are being used, they should be designed
to perform as efficiently as possible. If such programs are useful, implementing
more effective programs will result in less waste. If they are unnecessary, then
pursuing a path towards their optimization will eventually lead to their elimina-
tion.
18. Public utility commissions generally hold rate cases roughly every three years, though this varies
widely. These cases determine the price of electricity based on costs and historic or expected demand.
19. This is based on the difference between an average price of 8e/kWh and a short-run marginal cost
of 3e/kWh.
20. The lost-revenue problem is addressed for all but one of the utilities in Table 2 of Appendix A.
2 1. Ruff, Planning and Pricing, supra note I I; Richard J. Gilbert & John E. Henly, The Value of Rate
Reform in a Competitive Electric Power Market, i,, REGULATORY CHOICES: A PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOP-
MENTS IN ENERGY POLICY 84 (Richard Gilbert ed., 1991).
22. These opportunities may exist either because of the informational problems discussed in section
I. A., or because of negative externalities to the consumption of electricity which are not covered by the
retail price.
23. See supra notes 11-12.
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II. A Classification of Current Incentive Mechanisms: Markup, Bonus and
Shared Savings
An incentive mechanism consists of a rule for determining the size of the
incentive payment and a procedure for recovering this payment together with
utility expenditures. All DSM programs currently in place allow for the recov-
ery of expenditures, in addition to incentive payments, either by directly
expensing them or by including them in the utility rate base. Although recovery
mechanisms can be quite complex, they have a negligible impact on the
efficacy of the incentive.24 We ignore recovery mechanisms, thereby simplify-
ing and clarifying the task of classification. -5 Most incentive mechanisms
currently in place can be classified as one of three basic types: markup, bonus,
and shared savings.
Markup incentives reward the utility in proportion to its expenditure.
Program expenditure is limited by a cap, and the utility is allowed to recover
from the ratepayers an amount that exceeds its expenditure by the markup,
which is typically around five percent. The utility typically pays all of the cost
of a markup program, with no contribution from the program participants.
Markup incentives are employed most often for informational and low income
programs because it is very difficult to measure the net social benefit of these
programs. The advantage of a markup incentive is that it obviates all measure-
ment problems, thereby allowing its use when it is impossible or very costly
to verify benefits. Markup incentives may be used when regulators have
concluded subjectively that the program provides a net benefit. The problem
with this mechanism is that it provides an incentive to spend on conservation
programs without tieing that spending to the actual conservation of energy.
The bonus incentive mechanism rewards a utility for kilowatt-hours saved.
This requires the measurement of energy savings, which may be based on ex
ante engineering estimates, ex post measurement, or a combination of the two.
Typically, program participants share costs, but the shares vary dramatically
with the details of the program. The key drawback of the bonus incentive is
its assumption that all sources of cost and benefit other than kilowatt-hour
savings should be ignored. This incentive causes utilities to maximize saved
kilowatt-hours. The problem here is that kilowatt-hours may not correlate with
1 24. To the extent that the allowed return on the rate base exceeds a utility's cost of capital, including
conservation expenditures, the utility's rate base provides a markup incentive in addition to other incentives
explicitly provided by the program.
25. Previous classifications of shareholder DSM incentives, including those by Moskovitz, Barakat &
Chamberlin Inc., and Edison Electric Institute, have categorized incentive mechanisms both by the quantity
on which the incentive is based and by the method of payment. Such classification results in overlapping
categories and economically irrelevant classifications. MOSKOVITZ, supra note 1; BARAKAT & CHAMBERLIN,
INC., supra note 2: EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, TYPES OF INCENTIVE REGULATION: A PRIMER FOR THE
ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY (1993).
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maximum net benefit. For example, a utility that runs short of economic
conservation opportunities would still be motivated, under a bonus incentive,
to spend its last program dollar to save only a single kilowatt hour. The incen-
tive program would reimburse the utility one dollar for its expense and provide
an additional small incentive payment. Net benefit in this case would be
negative because the benefits would be only the few cents26 saved by not
generating one kilowatt-hour while the program costs would be one dollar.
A shared-savings incentive avoids the pitfalls of the bonus mechanism by
rewarding the utility based on the net benefit of the program, typically paying
fifteen percent of net benefit. This mechanism differs from the bonus system
in that it attempts to estimate the net social benefit of the program. Although
many procedures are used to compute net benefit, each program subtracts
program costs from the benefit of saved kilowatts and sometimes subtracts
participant costs and the cost of negative externalities. Like the markup and
bonus programs, there is always a cap on total program costs, and usually a
cap on the incentive payment.
Although non-linear functions are used by many incentive programs, it is
useful to present linear algebraic versions of the three incentive mechanisms.
A linear function not only illuminates how the programs differ in the coupling
of incentives to program costs (G), social costs (C), and to the quantity of
energy saved (Q)27 but also aids in the classification of specific programs. We
use the term "program costs" to indicate costs as calculated by the sponsoring
utility. Program costs differ from social costs, which are the opportunity costs
of resources involved in the program, as the former include transfers from all
ratepayers to program participants and exclude costs to participants.
Markup incentives reward the utility with a fraction of the cost of the
conservation program. Bonus incentives pay the utility in proportion to the
energy saved. In a shared-savings mechanism, the utility earns a fraction of the
difference between the value of the energy saved and the cost of the conserva-
tion program. The linear versions of these incentive types presented below will
help to define the relationship between the incentives and to classify particular
incentive programs.
Markup: I = X.G -4'
Bonus: I = X.Q -
Shared Savings: I = "(a Q - C) -
26. The average price of electricity in the U.S. is about 8c/kWh and must be close in value to the long-
run avoided cost.
27. Energy savings should be thought of as including capacity savings.
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In these equations, (a) is the per-unit value of energy and capacity saved, X is
the rate of incentive, (D is a fixed charge, and (I) is the incentive payment. The
fixed payment 4) has the property of decoupling the strength of the incentive,
which is determined by X, from the size of the incentive payment. In particular,
a positive (D can produce negative incentive payments in what is called a "pen-
alty region." Incentive mechanisms include a cap on the total program expendi-
ture. The bonus and shared-savings programs also include a cap on the incen-
tive payment. For markup programs, an incentive cap is effectuated by the
program expenditure cap.
There is considerable variation among utilities in the types of incentive
programs adopted and in the program parameters.2" Part IV examines the
theoretical reasons to favor one type of incentive scheme over another. Differ-
ences in program parameters might be explained by the varying opportunities
for conservation in individual utility systems. The size of the utility often deter-
mines the opportunities available to it.29
The shared-savings mechanism rewards the utility based on the difference
between the avoided cost of saved energy and some estimate of social costs,
(a . Q - C3), which is often referred to as the program net benefit (NB). Shared
savings has an obvious advantage relative to bonus and markup, because the
latter two fail to account for either the costs or the benefits in the conservation
equation. Yet both bonus and markup mechanisms are encountered in the
regulatory arena. For example, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) is allowed a
markup on two types of DSM programs: (1) equity programs that are designed
to improve the energy efficiency of low-income households at little or no cost
to the customer; and (2) energy-management service programs that are informa-
tional in nature.30 A markup program is ideal for these types of programs
because energy savings is difficult to measure and because these programs can
produce a negative net program benefit.
3
'
Two of the programs summarized in Appendix B, Pacific Gas and Electric's
(PG&E) and San Diego Gas and Electric's (SDG&E) shared-savings programs,
provide examples of mechanisms that suffer from being overly complex. PG&E
has adopted a nonlinear approach that results in a wildly fluctuating marginal
incentive, and SDG&E has adopted a complex formula that seems to promise
subtle motivational benefits, but which reduces, under the application of
28. Tables 2-A and 2-B in Appendix A summarize the incentive mechanisms of 13 specific utility
programs. The programs were chosen on the basis of size, interest, and data availability. All but three of
the programs fall into one of the three categories discussed in this Article.
29. Table 2-B in the Appendix presents the information in Table 2-A normalized to a 10TWh/yr utility.
This reduces, but hardly eliminates, the variation in incentive programs.
30. 90-08-068 Dec. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n (1990).
31. See PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, ANNUAL SUMMARY REPORT ON DEMAND SIDE
MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN 1991 AND 1992 (1992). There is an expectation that societal benefits would
be positive despite negative measured program benefits.
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elementary algebra, to the standard shared-savings formula with a strangely low
value for avoided cost.
III. Accounting for Conservation Costs and Benefits
This Part focuses on the definition and measure of net benefit. Net benefit,
properly defined, is the social value of energy conservation. Defining and
measuring net benefit is important in deciding which projects should be funded.
Projects with a positive net benefit should be funded while those with a nega-
tive net benefit should be discarded. The correct definition of net benefit
includes many components that are often omitted from incentive mechanisms
or improperly included, and all aspects pose difficult measurement problems.
The benefit of conservation is the value of the energy saved. The social
costs of conservation programs are the costs borne by; the utility, regulators,
program participants, and non-participant customers. These costs include actual
utility and consumer expenditures on equipment, material, and labor, and the
costs of program administration. Social costs also include managerial effort,
consumer disutility from program participation and from the conservation
measures themselves, and possible inefficiencies caused by higher prices. Social
costs are potentially significant, but difficult to quantify. Payments from non-
participant ratepayers to program participants are relatively easy to quantify but
have complex implications for social cost. As pure transfers from one group
to another, these payments do not shrink the available resources and therefore
are not true social costs. These transfers tend to be associated with social costs,
however, because they may have adverse distributional consequences and may
impair economic efficiency through secondary impacts on utility rates.32
A. Costs
The analysis in this Part is based on the data describing thirteen incentive
programs discussed in Appendix A. Utility expenditures, utility transfers to
consumers, customer costs, and evaluation costs are tabulated for each program.
This Part examines each of these cost categories and the problem of customer
disutility. This Part also explains how conservation programs have, and should
have, accounted for some of the more elusive social costs, such as the free-rider
problem and the rebound effect.
32. Transfers have to be paid for by increased rates, which may widen the gap between price and
marginal cost. When price exceeds the social or marginal cost of energy, consumption is inappropriately
penalized. The social loss from this reduced consumption can be attributed to the small difference between
the value of energy not used because of the inappropriate price and the saved marginal cost.
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1. Utility Expenditures
Utility expenditures on conservation programs include the cost of conserva-
tion equipment and associated material, labor costs, payments to -consumers,
and costs associated with program management and evaluation. Utility expendi-
tures may include some items that are not true social costs, such as transfer
payments to consumers, and may exclude some actual social costs, such as
consumer costs that have not been reimbursed.33
All of the programs allow the utility to recover its expenditures. 34 Aggre-
gating all incentive programs for each utility, program expenditures range from
about $15 to $50 million on a normalized basis. Adjusted for size, Massachu-
setts has the most aggressive program.
2. Transfer Payments and Customer Costs
There is considerable variation in the way that conservation programs
account for transfer payments, such as rebates, between the utility and partici-
pating customers. Three of the seven shared-savings programs include utility
transfer payments in computing net benefit. This practice understates the actual
net benefit of a conservation program. Two of these programs exclude customer
costs, which leads to an overstatement of a program's net benefit. Utilities often
hope that this overstatement is compensated for by the erroneous practice of
including utility transfer payments. Although transfer payments are a realloca-
tion of rates from one consumer group to another rather than a resource cost,
they may serve as a proxy for customer costs that are difficult to measure. Four
of the seven shared-savings programs correctly exclude transfer payments and
include customer costs in the evaluation of net benefit.
3. Regulatory Costs
Regulatory costs are the costs of designing and evaluating the conservation
incentive program. Program evaluation is the main component of these costs,
and the main functions of evaluation are to reward utilities for conservation
activities that produce positive net benefit and to determine the desirability of
subsequent DSM activities. To the extent costs can be divided between these
two functions, the cost of determining rewards should be included in the net
benefit calculation and the cost of determining subsequent DSM activities
33. To the extent that transfer payments contribute to pricing distortions, the adverse effects of these
distortions, but not the transfer payment, should be counted as a social cost of the conservation program.
Similarly, a separate account could be made of the distributive costs of transfer payments. Transfer payments
may be a proxy, however, for unobservable customer costs that should be included in a net benefit
calculation.
34. The programs differ on the timing of recovery, but include allowances for interest costs.
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should not. Approximately one-half of the utility programs listed in Table 3
include evaluation costs in the measure of net benefit.
4. Customer Disutility
All incentive programs omit the non-financial costs consumers sometimes
incur from conservation activities-customer disutility. One example of this
type of cost is consumer dissatisfaction with the quality of light from a compact
fluorescent bulb. These costs should be deducted from the net benefit of these
programs. However, customer disutility tends to be ignored in the evaluation
of conservation programs because its magnitude is difficult to quantify. For
example, in a recent study of demand-side measures completed by Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratories, measures such as switching from electric to gas cooking,
low-flow shower heads, and compact fluorescent lights were all assumed,
without investigation or discussion, to have zero disutility to the customer.
35
The extent of customer disutility from conservation programs is uncertain.
An extreme view is that it must be very large, otherwise efficient conservation
would have been undertaken. According to this view, the net benefit of conser-
vation should be reduced by an amount approximately equal to the pecuniary
savings from these programs. The theory behind this assertion is that the
customer's hidden costs must be at least that large to explain the customer's
failure to adopt the conservation technology. Another equally extreme view is
that customer disutility is small and that customers' failure to conserve is based
on easily corrected information. This view posits that customer disutility is a
temporary, initial phenomenon, that does not affect future conservation benefits
and has only an insignificant effect on the total present value of net benefit.
The true amount of customer disutility depends on the extent and depth of the
conservation measures. As utilities induce increasing levels of conservation,
customer disutility will inevitably grow in magnitude and thus gain increased
importance in program evaluation.
5. Non-Participant Costs
Conservation lowers system revenue requirements if the cost per kilowatt
hour of conserved energy, C, is less than the system's incremental avoided cost
of generation, a. When this condition (C < a) is satisfied, ratepayers as a whole
are better off when the utility invests in reducing demand rather than increasing
supply.36 A reduction in revenue requirements does not, however, imply a
reduction in electricity rates. Under rate-of-return regulation, rates (P), corre-
35. Koomey et al., supra note 9.
36. This statement assumes that any customer disutility from energy conservation is included in its COSt.
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spond to the utility's average production cost, while each kilowatt hour saved
by conservation reduces system costs by the utility's avoided cost of generation,
a. Conservation reduces the total demand available to generate revenue. For
each kilowatt hour saved, the lost revenue is P and the net lost revenue is P-a.
The net effect is that for each kilowatt hour saved by conservation, rates have
to increase by (P - a)/q, where q is total demand, to compensate for net lost
revenue and by C/q to compensate for the cost of the DSM. 7 System average
rates will increase if the sum of the two rate effects is positive, (P - a) + C
> 0, or equivalently if C > a-P. Since avoided cost of generation is less than
the average system price for most utilities with excess capacity (thus a-P is
negative), conservation will increase rates for these utilities, even if ratepayers
as a whole are better off. Conservation is likely to result in lower rates only
for systems whose capacity expansion costs are extraordinarily high.3"
When conservation results in higher rates, the consumers that participate
in conservation programs are made better off at the expense of non-participants.
Unless program participants compensate the non-participants for the higher
rates, there is a subsidy from the latter to the former.39 Although the partici-
pants could be required to compensate the non-participants, this rarely oc-
curs.4 ° Instead, conservation programs are frequently implemented with trans-
fer payments to induce customer participation. These transfers further increase
the rates that non-participants have to pay.
In addition to the distributional impacts of conservation programs, the
effects of these programs on rates can have adverse consequences for economic
efficiency. When the average cost of electricity exceeds its marginal cost, a
further increase in average cost distorts prices by discouraging consumption.
Higher rates lead to reduced demand and in some cases, cause customers to
bypass the regulated service. This problem has been particularly important in
the past decade, when a surplus of capacity in some jurisdictions led to electric-
ity prices that were several times the marginal generation costs.
37. For an alternative derivation, let AC be the system average cost and MC the system marginal cost,
both a function of sales, q. A reduction in sales of one kWh increases average cost by (AC - MC)/q. Under
rate regulation, AC is approximately P, the average system rate, and MC corresponds to the utility's avoided
cost, a.
38. For example, if the system's average rate is 8c/kWh, and if conservation costs are 3c/kWh, rates
would increase unless adding new capacity was expensive enough to push the cost of new generation above
I Ic/kWh.
39. Investment in new generation facilities also raises distributional issues. If a utility has to build costly
facilities to meet new demand, the cost is typically shared by all ratepayers. However, unlike expenditures
on demand-side management, consumers pay for generation facilities in approximate proportion to the
amount that they use these facilities.
40. If a conservation program produces positive net benefits, the participants should be able to
compensate non-participants in a way that leaves both groups better off.
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B. Benefits
The benefits of conservation are the reduction of generation costs and
associated externalities. The computation of these benefits is complicated by
difficulties in estimating conserved energy. It is unclear whether it is better to
measure conservation ex post or ex ante.
1. Value of Conserved Energy
All -the shared-savings and bounty programs give credit for both energy and
capacity savings, which are defined as "avoided costs," while markup programs
are based solely on costs. The incentive programs appear to measure the savings
correctly by using marginal, rather than average, energy and capacity costs. The
utilities varied in whether they included environmental externalities in their
calculation of conserved energy. The inclusion or exclusion of the externalities
and the size of inclusion is an important cause of variance in the conserved
energy values. Only two utilities take environmental externalities into account.
New York accounted for environmental externalities by adding 1.4 cents/
kilowatt hour (kWh) to their calculation of avoided cost, while Massachusetts
added 4 cents/kWh.
The measurement of conserved energy is further complicated by uncertainty
regarding the duration of conservation savings. Future energy and capacity
savings are discounted with one exception: regulators only pay Orange and
Rockland an incentive on its first year of energy savings.
2. Estimation of Energy Savings
Measurement is perhaps the most difficult problem encountered in conserva-
tion initiatives. The inability to verify energy savings is an important reason
for the perceived failure of markets to provide adequate investment in conserva-
tion. If savings were verifiable, private energy service companies could contract
with consumers to provide conservation services and could be paid based on
the savings that would result. One cannot conclude from this market failure that
utilities can fill the void as providers of conservation services. Without a means
to verify energy savings, the ability of regulators to encourage economically
efficient conservation is severely constrained.
Utilities use two approaches to estimate energy savings. The ex ante
approach relies on engineering estimates of savings from installed conservation
technologies. The ex post approach entails measurement of customer energy
use after the implementation of demand-side measures. The decision to use ex
ante estimates typically reflects an assessment that ex post measurement is too
costly. Use of ex post estimates suggests a concern with the biases and poor
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incentive qualities of ex ante estimates.4 Joskow and Marron report large
differences between ex ante estimates of conserved energy and ex post evalua-
tions of actual energy conservation; the former is notoriously inaccurate.42 This
inaccuracy suggests that there is a strong bias in ex ante estimates and that
absolute reliance on such estimates would be unwise. The future of conservation
incentive schemes is likely to depend on the development of methods to obtain
unbiased estimates of program savings at a reasonable cost.
Because technology advocates, consultants, regulators, and others in the
industry have private interests in the outcomes of conservation programs, it is
essential that measurement techniques guard against distortions in the evaluation
of program benefits. Estimates of energy savings are confounded by the com-
plex interaction of conservation incentives and energy consumption behavior.
These interactions produce the "free-rider" and "rebound" problems. Free-riders
are consumers who participate in energy conservation programs but would have
made conservation expenditures in the program's absence. Rebound refers to
an increase in consumption brought about by lower energy costs for consumers
who have invested in efficient energy-using durables.
a. Free-Riders
It is important to exclude free-riders from the calculation of conserved
energy because free-riders absorb program costs without producing any offset-
ting benefit. All the utilities surveyed claim to account for the free-rider
problem but use wholly inadequate estimation techniques. Central Maine
Power's (CMP) "quasi-experimental" savings measurement plan is a principal
method of accounting for the free-rider problem in the programs we reviewed.
Under this plan, a participant sample is compared with a non-participant
sample. For members of each sample, pre and post program annual consump-
tion is metered and the change is averaged. CMP then defines net savings per
participant as the difference between these two averages. No participants are
actually excluded as free-riders. CMP uses this procedure as a correction for
the free-rider bias. However, as the following analysisillustrates, this technique
can lead to gross under-correction.
If the program attracts mostly customers who would adopt the conservation
measure in any case, a free-rider problem is present. As Joskow and Marron
suggest, these free-riding customers, the ones most attracted to the conservation
incentive, are likely to experience greater than average energy savings from the
conservation measure, thereby inflating the measured net savings for program
41. Calibration studies can make ex ante measurement quite expensive. Ex ante measurement also
leaves the utility with an incentive to install conservation measures poorly in order to reduce net lost
revenues.
42. Joskow & Marron, supra note 12; see also supra note 14.
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participants. 3 In this case the quasi-experimental method will overestimate
the savings per genuine participant and will neglect to exclude any of the free-
riders, thereby greatly overestimating the effectiveness of conservation incen-
tives.
The quasi-experimental approach is also unsatisfactory because of the
dynamic nature of the free-rider problem. As Joskow and Marron point out,
"free riding is properly conceptualized not as a simple static decision ... , but
in terms of shifts in the diffusion curve . . . . " A participant who needed to
be induced to adopt the measure this year might adopt it voluntarily next year,
in which case he would be a free-rider for all but the first year.
Whether ex post or ex ante, in order to account for free-riders, measure-
ments of conservation savings must be compared with predictions of how
customers would have behaved without the DSM programs. Utilities currently
employ other methods, besides the quasi-experimental approach, to estimate the
extent of the free-rider problem, but these approaches are generally more ad-
hoc; although equally accurate. Rigorous statistical procedures, such as those
used by Train and Strebel," are rarely, if ever, used.
b. Rebound
Rebound refers to the increase in the demand for energy services caused
by energy-efficiency programs that reduce the cost of these services. For
example, a consumer is likely to use an efficient air conditioner more than an
inefficient air conditioner because the marginal cost of use is lower. While the
free-rider problem may result in attributing too much benefit to conservation
measures, rebound tends to cause an underattribution of benefits, particularly
when ex post measurement is used.46 Some observers, among them some of
the strongest proponents of DSM, have argued the reverse; they claim that
rebound reduces actual net benefit and thereby leads to its over-estimation. This
point of view, however, fails to recognize that it is customer utility. and not
energy conservation per se which matters.
Customers choose to consume rebound energy because it provides them
with increased utility. Since this choice is voluntary, the benefit provided by
the energy service must be greater than what would have been provided by the
cost of the rebound energy. Ex ante measurement fails to capture the net gain
in utility from using rebound energy, while ex post measurement fails to capture
43. Joskow & Marron, supra note 12, at 44.
44. Id. at 46.
45. Train, Incentives for Energy, supra note 14: Train, The Economic Value, supra note 14; Kenneth
E. Train & Judi E. Strebel, Energy Conservation and Rebates in Commercial Food Enterprises, AM. J.
AGRIC. EcoN., Feb. 1987, at 106.
46. An argument in favor of ex ante savings estimates is that they are not affected by rebound. This
may be small compensation compared to the other biases encountered with ex ante savings estimates.
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the gross utility of rebound energy use. Thus, while ex ante measurement
simply ignores the benefit of rebound, ex post measurement erroneously
considers it as a benefit reduction significant enough to negate the entire benefit
of some conservation measures.
IV. Imperfect Information and the Design of Incentives
Recent economic literature on incentive mechanism design reveals that
informational problems lie at the heart of incentive design problems.4 7 There-
fore, this Part will approach the analysis and design of utility incentives from
the regulator's informational status. It will analyze four cases in which different
informational deficiencies determine the optimal incentive scheme.
If the regulator's information is perfect, the incentive problem can be solved
easily through a forcing contract. The markup mechanism is one such contract.
If the regulator does not have a publicly verifiable estimate of net benefit, and
the utility has private information on how best to implement DSM, the markup
mechanism is still optimal even though it achieves only a second best out-
come.48 If the regulator is unable to verify the utility's actions, but has a
publicly verifiable estimate of net benefit, it becomes inefficient to use a forcing
contract. Instead, a shared-savings mechanism would produce the optimal
outcome and would require only a small incentive payment.
Frequently in actual regulation scenarios, the regulator faces a serious
informational gap. The regulator may not be able to observe a crucial compo-
nent of the utility's cost. We term this unobservable cost "effort." When effort
is costly, productive, and unobservable, the utility is able to extract information
rent from a regulator who is trying to achieve optimal results. Again, the
shared-savings mechanism is the appropriate contract form, but in this case a
substantial incentive is necessary. There can be a further complication if the
regulator cannot make an unbiased estimate of net benefit. In this instance it
may be impossible to design a useful incentive mechanism.
A. Perfect Information
Although one almost never has perfect information, it is useful to examine
this possibility in order to make comparisons with the cases of imperfect
information discussed in this work. With perfect information, the regulator can
47. JEAN-JACQUES LAFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND REGULA-
TION (1993).
48. We will use the term "efficient" to mean the best that could be done with perfect information, and
the term "second best" to describe a mechanism or outcome that is the best that can be achieved given
informational constraints and self-interested parties.
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observe the utility's actions, and calculate the net benefit that results. 49 In
addition, observations of actions, costs, and benefits must be publicly verifiable,
and the utility must not have more information regarding the implementation
of conservation than the regulator. Under these informational conditions, the
regulator can employ either a markup or a shared-savings mechanism, and only
the smallest incentive beyond cost reimbursement will be necessary to insure
compliance.
The first two cases of incomplete information assume the regulator can
make unbiased estimates of all relevant quantities. In the first case, the regulat-
or's estimate of net benefit is not publicly verifiable. This circumstance necessi-
tates a markup contract, and will only create a problem if the utility possesses
private information on how best to implement DSM. The second case of
incomplete information does not have this problem, as the regulator is able to
verify its estimate of net benefit.
B. Case 1: The Regulator Can Verify Actions but Not Net Benefit
In this case, as in the case of perfect information, the regulator can observe
and publicly verify the utility's actions, and the costs and consequences of those
actions. But, there is an essential informational gap for the regulator because
the cost of verifying its estimate of the net benefit would be prohibitive.
Given this informational constraint, optimal regulation is relatively straight-
forward. The best incentive mechanism encourages the utility to undertake
conservation actions that the regulator has privately determined to be the best
alternatives among the known options. An incentive mechanism designed to
induce a specific action is called a forcing contract. A markup incentive
combined with a cap on program expenditures makes up such a contract and
could be used effectively under the assumed informational conditions.
Principle 1: If the regulator can verify a utility's costs and actions, and
has an unbiased but not publicly verifiable estimate of net benefit, then a cost-
based forcing contract is efficient.
The forcing contract should reimburse all expenses, and must specify the
amount and manner in which the money is to be spent. If the utility is also
allowed to earn a percentage of every dollar spent, without regard to net
benefit, the utility will spend up to the expenditure cap and complete the
program. This would be a well-implemented markup program. In place of a
markup, a penalty could be imposed for failing to complete the program. Either
49. Actually. a very imperfect but unbiased estimate of benefits will serve the regulator as well as a
perfect estimate, provided the utility is not overly risk averse.
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method will be effective and require only the smallest reward or penalty
provided that the contract reimburses both direct and indirect utility costs.
Markup programs present a significant danger of inefficiency because the
stringent informational assumptions detailed above are often not met. When the
regulator finds it difficult to observe the utility's actions, it will reward the
utility only for costs incurred and not for actions taken. In such a case, the
utility will have an incentive to act perversely. For example, the utility might
turn a conservation education program into a disguised public relations cam-
paign.50 A second danger is that the inability to publicly verify the regulator's
private estimate of net benefit may indicate that the estimate is dramatically
biased.
The fact that the utility may have private information is the second informa-
tional problem that exists in Case 1. That is, the utility may know better ways
of conducting the conservation program than the regulator. In this case, the
efficient program would be one that makes use of that private information. Such
behavior could only be induced, however, if the regulator could publicly verify
the benefit of that information. Otherwise, a contract inducing the use of the
private information could not be enforced. In this case, a forcing contract (for
example, a type of markup program) is still the best that can be done, and thus,
qualifies as a second best contract. A markup mechanism, however, provides
no incentive for the utility to choose the most effective expenditures.
Informational and educational programs are candidates for a markup incen-
tive if the regulator can estimate, but not easily verify, the effectiveness of these
programs. If it is also true that the utility has no private information about
the savings produced by such programs, or about the cost of these programs,
a markup program is economically efficient, as well as the best that can be
done.
The next case removes the assumption that actions are observable and
verifiable, and assumes that the outcome, the program's net benefit, can be
verifiably estimated. The utility still has good estimates of both costs and
benefits, but benefits are verifiable and actions are not. A shared-savings
incentive is most appropriate here, and the central incentive-design problem
becomes more apparent.
50. Letter from C. M. Walwyn, Administrative Law Judge of the California PUC 36 (Oct. 17, 1993)
(regarding proposed decision concerning Application 93-04-028 of PG&E) ("We state strongly and unequivo-
cally that DSM funds that would otherwise have been refunded to ratepayers should not have been used
for corporate image enhancement .... ").
5 1. This does not preclude offering a reward that depends on the difference between a forecast of
energy consumption and actual consumption at a future date, though it would be difficult to verify that actual
consumption was influenced by the program.
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C. Case 2: The Regulator Has a Verifiable and Unbiased Estimate
of Net Benefit
In this case, the regulator has an unbiased and publicly verifiable estimate
of all costs, and of the program's net benefit. However, the utility's actions are
expensive to monitor, or the regulator is relatively uninformed about the
connection between utility action and net benefit. Consequently, the regulator
prefers to rely on estimated benefits. The utility can be induced to make use
of its private information through the use of a true incentive contract rather than
the simpler forcing contract.
The net benefit of a conservation project that saves an amount of energy
Q with avoided cost (a) is given by aQ - C, where C, includes all social costs
incurred by the utility, program participants, and non-participants. The following
analysis assumes that an optimal outcome maximizes the expected welfare of
the regulator, who counts equally both consumer welfare and producer prof-
its.
52
A regulator whose objective is to promote expected social welfare would
desire any conservation program that has a positive expected net benefit. The
regulated utility should be willing to pursue any program in which the utility
is fully compensated for all of its costs, including managerial effort and indirect
costs such as lost revenue. Thus, if the regulator offers the utility a fraction,
however small, of program-net benefit, the utility would have an incentive to
engage in a DSM program. The regulator would want the utility to engage in
the program only if it has a positive expected net benefit. Verification is
important to ensure that a contract between the utility and the regulator is
legally binding. Principle 2 follows from these conditions.
53
52. An abundant body of literature shows how the regulator might wish to alter incentives if the
regulator wants to promote the welfare of one group at the expense of another, or if collecting revenues
from consumers incurs a social cost. See, e.g., Tracy R. Lewis & David E.M. Sappington, Regulating a Monop-
olist with Unknown Demand, 78 AM. ECON. J. 968 (1988); Tracy R. Lewis & David E.M. Sappington,
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions, RAND J. OF EcON., Autumn 1989,
at 438 [hereinafter Lewis & Sappington, Regulating a Monopolist]; Tracy R. Lewis & David E.M.
Sappington, Incentives for Conservation and Quality-Improvement by Public Utilities (1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Yale Journal on Regulation) [hereinafter Lewis & Sappington, Incentives for
Conservation]. For DSM programs, the regulator may put different weights on participating and non-
participating consumers, as well as on the regulated firm. We ignore these important complications and
instead emphasize the more basic elements of efficient mechanism design.
53. This result and the next are subject to an important qualification. The regulated utility should take
into account the return it could earn in other activities, such as constructing new generation facilities, when
choosing how much effort to allocate to DSM programs. If the utility is rewarded meagerly in these other
activities, a large reward for DSM programs might divert the utility's attention from other, more valuable,
pursuits. The socially optimal incentive scheme should offer private incentives to the firm for each of its
alternative activities that are in proportion to the activity's contribution to social value. This qualification
would not be necessary if the firm's cost of effort were properly estimated at its societal opportunity cost.
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Principle 2: If a regulator can obtain a verifiable unbiased estimate of net
benefit, any shared-savings incentive scheme is efficient, no matter how small
the incentive.
When the regulator has an unbiased, verifiable estimate of all the social
costs and benefits of conservation investments, a shared-savings program makes
expected utility profits exactly proportional to social value. Since this result
holds for any level of benefit sharing, even the most modest share is adequate
to induce the utility to pursue socially productive conservation. The incentives
actually offered by the shared-savings programs reviewed in this Article are
substantial. This suggests that either regulators are unconcerned about the
distributional implications of large rewards for utility DSM programs, or that
they believe such rewards are necessary to compensate utilities for unobservable
effort or other elements of program costs that are unknown to the regulator.
These observations require us to consider the structure of efficient incentive
programs when the regulator's information is more limited. The next two cases
examine the consequences for efficient incentive design when the regulator is
imperfectly and asymmetrically informed about utility costs or net benefit.
D. Case 3: Some Utility Costs Cannot Be Observed
The previous case revealed that the utility's private information is sufficient
to explain the need for an incentive mechanism, but that the inaccuracy of the
measure of net benefit did not cause any additional problems.54 Specifically,
measurement errors did not justify a significant level of incentive payment,
which is contrary to the general assertion that conservation measurement prob-
lems create the need for substantial incentives. This Part adheres to recent eco-
nomic theory which suggests that substantial incentives are needed not because
of conservation measurement problems, but because the utility's true costs
cannot be observed.55
In this case, we assume that the regulator knows less about program costs
than the utility. Specifically, it is assumed that the regulator cannot measure
the cost of the effort required to make a program succeed. The utility has two
forms of private information, program costs and its information about efficient
program design. The regulator's measure of net benefit is flawed by the omis-
sion of the cost of effort, which is real, but not observable by the regulator.
However, if the regulator rewards the utility with 100% of its measure of
54. It is typical of incentive problems that an unbiased estimate of net benefit is sufficient to provide
correct motivation so long as utilities are not risk averse. Provided the programs are small compared with
the utility's scale of operation and are repeated so that errors can average out, risk aversion should be a
minor consideration.
55. David Barron & Roger Myerson, Regulating a Monopolist With Unknown Costs, 50 EcoNOMETRICA
911 (1982).
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program net benefit, the utility would be motivated to apply enough effort to
the program to maximize social value. This is formalized in Principle 3.
Principle 3: If a risk neutral regulator can obtain an unbiased estimate of net
benefit except for some utility costs, and the utility has private cost information,
then a shared-savings incentive scheme with the utility earning 100% of
measured net benefit is the only efficient incentive.
Measured net benefit includes all social costs and benefits except the
unobservable costs incurred by the utility while conducting the DSM program.
To understand the above result, consider what it means to earn 100% of
measured net benefit. Since this incentive payment is in addition to reimburse-
ment for the utility's observed costs, Cu, and transfer payments, T (which are
not a social cost and thus are omitted from net benefit), its profit is
it = - (C, + T + E) + (C, + 7) + (aQ - C, - C)
or it = aQ - C, - C, - E
where t is profit, E is the unobserved cost of effort, and C, is customer
costs.56 The three parenthetical quantities represent, from left to right, utility
expenditure, reimbursement, and incentive payment. Note that while the incen-
tive payment equals measured net benefit, the utility's profit is exactly the true
social net benefit including the unobserved cost of utility effort. Thus a profit
maximizing firm will automatically maximize social value.-7 Clearly, if the
incentive payment were to be changed in any way, the firm's profit would no
longer equal true net benefit and the firm would be motivated to maximize
something other than social value. Thus, an incentive payment of 100% of
measured net benefit is the only optimal level for the incentive."
Having a part of utility costs unobservable causes absolutely no problem
in equating profit with true net benefit. An easily verified implication of this
property is that the utility's misreporting of costs is of no consequence. Since
every dollar of cost reported is reimbursed and then deducted from the incentive
payment, the utility bears the full cost of the program. This alleviates some
56. These variables should include any allocative or distributional costs that result from transfer
payments.
57. See Martin Loeb & Wesley A. Magat, A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation, 22 J.L. &
EcoN. 399 (1979) (Loeb and Magat first demonstrated the efficiency of this scheme).
5h. This is, again, subject to the qualification that the utility not have competing alternatives for
managerial effort where the private and social returns do not coincide.
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potentially acrimonious auditing problems recently dramatized by the case of
Pacific Gas and Electric's DSM sports marketing contracts.5 9
This incentive mechanism does not call for an enormous transfer of funds
from ratepayers to stockholders. Principle 3 is at odds with conventional
wisdom because it suggests that while marginal incentives should be very high,
net transfers can be very low.60 The utility could be assessed a fixed charge
equal to the expected value of net benefit, so that the expected total incentive
payment would be zero.61 This assessment would not disturb the incentive
properties implied by Principle 3, yet it would avoid large transfers of income
to the utility. However, none of the shared-savings programs reviewed in this
Article offer an incentive close to 100% of marginal net benefit, and generally
the incentives offered are not offset by a fixed charge.
E. Case 4: Benefit Is Not Observable
The fourth case assumes that program benefits are not observable. Because
the benefits cannot be determined, it i's impossible to design useful incentive
mechanisms. The regulator can deal with private information about a program's
costs by putting the utility in the residual claimant's position as to the value
of energy savings. This is impossible when program benefits cannot be mea-
sured. The regulator lacks a mechanism to penalize a utility's attempts to profit
by overstating the program benefits.
Without an unbiased estimate of energy savings, there is no practical way
to encourage energy conservation without transferring large rents to regulated
firms. If an incentive program rewards claimed energy savings, a utility will
claim large savings whether or not they are realized. A regulator can only
prevent this erroneous claim if it can observe some aspect of utility operations
59. An issue regarding PG&E's sports marketing contracts arose during the review of its annual request
for shareholder earnings based on DSM program performance CPUC Docket No. A.93-04-028. The
merchandising component of these contracts included, among other things, season tickets, VIP receptions,
parking permits, a catered tailgate party, a road trip, and team memorabilia. Letter from C. M. Walwyn,
Administrative Law Judge of the California PUC, supra note 50, at 22. As a result of publicity over these
DSM expenditures, PG&E voluntarily reduced its shareholder incentive request by three million dollars.
Opening Brief of PG&E on DSM Shareholder Incentives, October 27, 1993, p.2 1.
60. See Michael W. Reid & John H. Chamberlin, Financial Incentives for DSM Programs: A Review
and Analysis of Three Mechanisms, in INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING 5.157 (1990). The Reid article
reaches a conclusion completely different from the logic of Principle 2. The authors claim that the critical
feature of incentive programs is that they offer total rewards large enough to catch the utility's attention.
This presumption does not explain why incentives which are very large on the margin would not also interest
a utility or why the prospect (if gaining a large sum on the margin would be less motivating than the total
return.
61. Actually, the expected net transfer to the utility should exactly equal E, the cost of effort. Because
E cannot be observed, the regulator cannot reimburse the utility for this cost. If expected net transfer does
not equal benefit, earnings will suffer and the cost of capital to the utility may increase. This is impossible
to obtain since the regulator does not know E. Nonetheless, some rough attempt to compensate the utility
for E should be made. This compensation must be done through the fixed charge and not through the
variable part of the incentive.
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that is correlated with the energy savings. Lewis and Sappington use total
output for this purpose.62 It is difficult to determine the effects of conservation
from this type of aggregate statistic, but the incentive mechanism described by
Lewis and Sappington gives a utility no incentive to overstate conservation
benefits. Their mechanism requires that the results of the program have a
measurable impact on utility's marginal production costs and that these costs
increase with output. Measurement error would overwhelm applications of their
scheme to specific conservation programs. When it is applied to the aggregate
of many conservation programs, thereby increasing the correlation of energy
savings with total demand, their scheme becomes only slightly more plausi-
ble.6
3
A partial lack of information about actual energy savings is not serious if
the regulator can make an unbiased estimate.' The regulator can base rewards
on ex ante expected energy savings or on ex post measured savings, as long
as these figures are unbiased. The utility must also be willing to discount the
risk of inaccurately calculated rewards for energy savings-not an unreasonable
assumption for small conservation programs. When applied to many programs
over an extended period of time, aggregate realized rewards should be a close
approximation of the correct reward for actual savings.
An unbiased estimate of measured net benefit is the key to successful
energy conservation programs. If an unbiased estimate is available and the cost
of effort is known, or if the cost of effort is unobserved and the utility has
private information with a 100% shared-savings scheme, then the regulator can
reward the utility with a small shared-savings incentive.
Conclusion
Utility conservation incentives offer substantial economic gains by focusing
appropriate managerial effort on energy conservation programs. They are
necessary because the traditional rate structure fails to align the utility's profit
motive with the social value of energy conservation. A correctly designed and
implemented incentive will motivate only enough conservation to compensate
62. Lewis & Sappington, Regulating a Monopolist, supra note 52; see also Lewis & Sappington,
Incentives for Conservation, supra note 52.
63. Even if applied to an aggregation of programs, the approach presented by Lewis and Sappington
(1991) would involve significant regulatory risk. See supra note 61. Their approach requires the regulator
to set the price of electricity at a level that induces the correct after-DSM demand level. Small errors in
price would result in large errors in induced DSM relative to efficient levels. Since both positive and
negative errors in the amount of DSM cause inefficiency, the expected efficiency gain could be substantially
negative. A new paper by Lewis takes an approach based on net benefit that avoids these problems. Tracy
R. Lewis, Designing Utility-Tailored Incentive Programs for Energy Efficiency and Conservation (June 1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Yale Journal On Regulation).
64. Michael H. Riordan& David E.M. Sappington, Optimal Contracts with Public Ex-PostInformation,
1988 J. OF ECON. THEORY 189.
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for market failure and the utility's informational and cost advantages. This
Article is a first look at current incentive programs and their effectiveness in
stimulating efficient conservation investment.
By ignoring differences in the form of incentive payments, and instead
focusing on the economic structure of incentives, this Article classifies most
existing programs according to whether incentives are paid based on energy
savings (bonus), costs (markup), or net benefit (shared savings). There are two
exceptions to these classifications and both appear to have no economic ratio-
nal. Many existing programs are found to employ unnecessarily complex
incentive mechanisms. Other programs exhibit sudden arbitrary changes in
marginal incentive from one performance level to the next.
Shared savings is the most appropriate type of incentive and currently the
most common. As a result, the correct measurement of net benefit is crucial
to the success of DSM incentives. Unfortunately, net benefit is difficult and
expensive to measure. On the cost side, the most common and important
mistakes are the inclusion of transfer payments, and the exclusion of direct
customer costs and customer disutility. Customer disutility is universally
ignored because of severe measurement problems, despite its inevitable impor-
tance as conservation is pushed towards its economic limits. On the benefit
side, problems include improper accounting for free riders and the rebound
effect. The rebound effect is often misunderstood as the reason that ex ante
engineering estimates overstate the benefits of conservation measures. In fact,
while rebound causes a reduction in energy savings relative to engineering
estimates, it also causes an increase in net benefit relative to those estimates.
Correctly defining net benefit and improving its measurement would dramat-
ically improve current incentive programs; however, such a development is
unlikely. An extension of current federal efforts to include properly standardized
estimates of net benefit in the collection of DSM data would substantially
improve the situation."
The design of an efficient incentive plan depends on what is known to the
regulator and the utility about the costs and benefits of conservation programs.
The better and more verifiable the regulator's information, the more effective
and less costly the best available incentive mechanism will be. If the regulator
can observe utility costs and actions and can estimate, but not publicly verify,
benefits then the utility's private information about conservation opportunities
cannot be used. However, a simple and cost effective markup incentive can
induce the utility to implement the regulator's conservation program. If the
utility lacks private information about conservation opportunities, this is the
65. Currently, the Department of Energy's Energy Information Agency collects DSM data using
Schedule V of form EIA-861.
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economically efficient solution; if it has private information, this is an optimal
but second best outcome.
Only two incentive types, markup and shared savings, provide efficient
incentives. If the regulator can make an unbiased estimate of net benefit, the
utility's private information can and should be used. Using this information can
be done efficiently with a shared-savings mechanism. When the regulator can
observe all costs, a shared-savings mechanism should be implemented with a
minimal marginal incentive payment. When some utility costs, such as manage-
rial effort, are unobservable by the regulator, the incentive should offer the
utility 100% of measured net benefit. The regulator can recover expected
payments to the utility by including a large fixed fee in the incentive plan.
Existing plans differ from this standard in that they provide a much lower
incentive at a much greater cost to the customer.
Conservation programs succeed when savings can be measured. If adequate
measurement techniques are established, high-powered incentives can lead to
efficient conservation expenditures. Problems arise if estimates of conservation
are biased. Although incentive programs can correct for predictable differences
between claims and realized benefits, a more serious problem is that there may
be no systematic relation between claimed and actual savings or that measure-
ment of actual savings may be subject to unacceptable error.
If net benefit can be measured and the incentive payment is 100% of
measured net benefit, ratepayers are, on average, better off with any conserva-
tion program that achieves a positive net benefit provided that the mechanism
includes a fixed charge. Efficient conservation incentives do not penalize
generation investments.66 Instead, such incentives benefit ratepayers by encour-
aging the utility to exploit another dimension of service.
66. This statement assumes that conservation incentives do not cause utilities to allocate too much
managerial effort to DSM at the expense of supply-side investments.
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Appendix A
Table 1 illustrates the rapid growth of utility conservation incentive pro-
grams since their introduction. Expenditures on utility DSM programs are
projected to reach almost $1 billion in 1992-one-half to two-thirds of total
expenditures on utility DSM programs.
Tables 2-A and 2-B summarize the incentive mechanisms of thirteen
specific programs chosen on the basis of size, interest, and data availability.
The incentive formula is presented as the type of incentive and three parame-
ters: ., the fraction of the quantity paid as an incentive; 0, the fixed charge;
and I, the cap on the incentive payment.' Some of the programs are actually
composed of several sub-programs. These sub-programs are aggregated in
Tables 2-A and 2-B with the assumption that performance is similar in each
sub-program. All but two of the mechanisms reported in Tables 2-A and 2-B
fall into the three basic categories. These two, Orange and Rockland Utilities
Inc. (O&R) and Southern California Edison (SCE), are closely related to our
three categories. Several of the programs have different linear incentives for
different regions of net benefit, and regulators in California have sponsored
more than one style of incentive program at a single utility. In addition, three
of the utility incentive programs that include non-zero fixed charges employ
a formula for this charge that scales it to the size of the program. However,
conditioned on the program size, the charge is independent of program imple-
mentation and outcome, and thus is a fixed component of the incentive plan.
Some of the differences in program parameters can be explained by the various
opportunities for conservation in individual utility systems. A rough index of
opportunities is the size of the utility. Table 2-B presents the information in
Table 2-A normalized to a 10 TWh/yr utility.2 This method reduces, but does
not eliminate, the variation in incentive programs.'
As has been mentioned, the lost-revenue problem penalizes utilities for
selling less electricity when price is above the marginal cost of generation. This
negative DSM incentive can be corrected with a general mechanism such as
California's ERAM or with a mechanism that is aimed only at revenues lost
through effective DSM, as is done with Western Massachusetts Electric. The
only utility in our study that is not subject to either correction is Massachusetts
Electric. Consequently it suffers a disincentive to DSM that should be added
to the incentive reported in our tables. The form of this disincentive is a
I. Some of the programs in Table 2-A have no incentive cap, which is equivalent to an arbitrarily large
I.
2. For example, CMP has about 9.136 TWh/yr of net sales. The normalization factor for this utility
is therefore 10 TWlfyr + 9.136 TWh/yr = 1.0946, and the normalized incentive cap is $2.7 million x 1.0946
= $3.0 million.
3. Data presented in Part Il suggest a lower variation among programs in actual expenditures on
conservation.
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negative bonus mechanism since losses are proportional to energy saved. Since
we do not know the magnitude of this disincentive, we have not tried to com-
bine it with the shared-savings program that is explicitly implemented.
Table 3 summarizes, on a normalized basis, the elements of costs that are
included in the programs listed in Tables 2-A and 2-B. The cost categories in
Table 3 are utility expendi*tures, utility transfers to consumers, customer costs,
and evaluation costs. The third column in Table 3 shows actual program
expenditures.4 All of the programs in Tables 2-A and 2-B allow the utility to
recover its expenditures, either by expensing or by including the expenditure
in the rate base.5 Actual program expenditures range from about $10 to $50
million on a normalized basis. Corrected for size, the most aggressive programs
are the Massachusetts shared-savings and bonus incentives. Aggregating all
incentive programs for each utility in Table 3, the incentives fall in a relatively
narrow expenditure range of $13 to $21 million except for the Massachusetts
programs.
Table 3 also shows considerable variation in the way conservation programs
account for transfer payments between the utility and participating customers
when evaluating net benefit. Three of the seven shared-savings programs in
Table 3 include utility transfer payments in the net benefit. This practice
understates the actual net benefit of a conservation program. PG&E, O&R, and
Central Hudson Gas & Electric include utility transfers in net benefit but
exclude customer costs. Excluding customer costs clearly overstates program
net benefit, which may or may not be compensated for by the erroneous inclu-
sion of utility transfer payments. Four of the seven shared-savings programs
exclude transfer payments and include customer costs in the evaluation of net
benefit. Approximately half of the utility programs listed in Table 3 include
evaluation costs in the measure of net benefit. Issues associated with program
evaluation are discussed in more detail in the measurement of program benefits.
Table 4-A provides avoided costs of energy and capacity for the selected
programs. The values are generally consistent with the measures of marginal,
rather than average, energy and capacity costs. The most important differences
in the value of conserved energy for individual utilities are the inclusion or
exclusion of an adder for environmental externalities and the size of the adder.
Environmental externalities are only accounted for in New York, at a rate of
$0.014-$0.016/kWh, and in Massachusetts, at $0.04/kWh. Table 4-A shows esti-
mates of conserved energy and capacity from the shared-savings and bonus
programs for each utility. These are ex ante technical estimates of the savings
that are expected from the installation of equipment in 1991. Also shown in
Table 4-A is an estimate of the present discounted avoided cost from these
4. The data in Table 3 are based on actual annual expenditures.
5. The programs differ on the timing of recovery but include allowances for interest costs.
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1991 installations. There is considerable variation in the expected savings from
the different utility programs. Table 4-B shows the estimated savings on a
normalized basis. The variance is greatly reduced, but there is still approxi-
mately a four-to-one range in savings estimates, excluding environmental
adders. The range increases with environmental adders because of Massachu-
setts utilities' high estimate of expected savings and high environmental exter-
nality.
Table 5 is a summary of the expected net benefit of programs in place in
1991 and the incentive payments earned on these programs, all reported on a
normalized basis. The data show a somewhat wider range of expected net
benefit than the range of normalized costs reported in Table 4-B. Actual
incentive payments also show a wide variation. Expressed as a percentage of
expected net benefit, the incentive payments range from less than 2% to about
13%, with an average of about 6%.
Together, Tables 4 and 5 show that there is little relation, on either a
normalized or nominal basis, between the magnitude of incentives and the level
of expected energy savings.6 This result is not surprising because energy
savings depend on many factors, such as the characteristics of conservation
opportunities and the experience of utility management, that are not accounted
for in these tables.
6. The lack of a systematic relation between the size of incentives and energy savings is further
confounded by the fact that there are many conservation programs in place where the utility is only allowed
to expense costs (or to include costs in the rate base). These programs are not counted as incentive programs
in our classification, yet there is no reason to believe that they are not successful in achieving positive net
benefits.
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Table 1. Utility Incentives and Expenditures
Incentive and Expenditures in $ Millions
1990 1991 1992 Total
Inc. Exp. Inc. Exp. Inc. Exp. Inc. Exp. Ratio
CA Pacific G&E 14.9 63.5 47.4 136.0 50.7 141.0 113.0 340.5 0.33
CA San Diego G&E 9,2 17.0 10.7 36.1) 7.1 45.0 27.0 98.0 0.28
CA So. Calif. Edison 4.0 80.0 9.1 125.0 8.0 153.0 21.1 358.0 0.1)6
CA So. Calif. Gas 1.3 52.0 3.7 59(0 6.0 59.0 11.0 17110 0.)6
CO Public Service Co. 0.1 0.5 0.2 3.3 0.5 11.0 1 0.8 14.8 0.05
CT United Illuminating 1.5 7.0 0.3 11.3 0.5 15.2 1.3 33.5 0.04
ME Central Maine Power 0.0 1.0 3.0 17.0 3.0 25.0 6.0 42.0 0.14
MA Mass. Electric 5.0 37.0 10.8 55.11 2.2 68.0 18.0 160.0 0.11
MA Western Mass. Elec. 0.3 9.5 0.9 18.0 1.2 18.7 2.4 46.2 0.05
MI Consumers Power 11.5 8.0 5.5 32.5 5.5 32.5 11.5 73.1) 0.16
MN Northern States 0.0 0.0 0.1 15.0 0.3 18.0 0.4 33.0 0.01
NH Granite State Elec. 0.5 1.4 1.0 3.1 1.1 3.8 2.6 8.3 0.31
NY Central Hudson G&E 0.0 4.5 0.7 7.0 2.2 18.0 2.9 29.5 1.10
NY Con Edison 0.0 0.0 22.1 76.0 25.0 89.0 47.0 165.0 0.28
NY Long Island Lighting 0.0 29.0 0.0 32.0 3.2 35.0 3.2 96.0 (.03
NY New York State E&G 0.0 13.0 2.0 23.11 3.2 34.0 5.2 70.0 0.07
NY Niagara Mohawk 1.5 7.6 9.0 45.0 7.0 58.0 17.5 110.6 0.16
NY Orange & Rockland 0.0 0.0 2.7 9.0 NYA 10.0 2.7 19.0 0.14
NY Rochester G&E 0.8 8.0 0.8 6.2 0.9 7.8 2.5 22.0 0.11
OR Pacific Power & Light 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 10.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.75
OR Portland GE 0.0 0.0 1.8 15.01 1.9 21.0 3.7 35.0 0.11
RI Narragansett Electric 3.0 14.1) 3.0 19.1 2.9 17.7 8.9 50.8 1 .18
Sum 42 352 133 744 131 880 306 1,976 15%
Ratio 12% 18% 15% 15%
NYA = Not Yet Available
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The data for Table I are taken from the following sources: BARAKAT & CHAMBERLIN, INC.,
SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC, UTILITY DSM SHAREHOLDER INCENTIVE STUDY (1991); CENTRAL
HUDSON GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT: ANNUAL EVALUATION
FOR THE PERIoD 6/1/90-5/31/91 AND ESTIMATED RESULTS FOR THE PERIOD 6/1/91-5/31/92
(1991); CENTRAL MAINE POWER COMPANY, DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY REPORT
(1991); MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY, DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT,. SUMMARY OF
BUDGET, VALUE, KW AND KWh BY PROGRAM (1991); NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION,
1990 ANNUAL EVALUATION REPORT: DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (1991); NIAGARA
MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION, 1991 ANNUAL EVALUATION REPORT: DEMAND-SIDE MANAGE-
MENT PROGRAM (1992); ORANGE AND ROCKLAND UTILITIES, INC., PROGRAM EVALUATION (1992);
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, ANNUAL SUMMARY REPORT ON DEMAND-SIDE MANAGE-
MENT PROGRAMS IN 1990 AND 1991 (1992); PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, ANNUAL
SUMMARY REPORT ON DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN 1991 AND 1992 (1992);
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, ANNUAL REPORT ON DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT
PROGRAMS IN 1991 AND 1992: TECHNICAL APPENDIX (1992); UNITED ILLUMINATING COMPANY,
ENERGY ACTION '92 (1992); SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, ANNUAL SUMMARY OF
DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES (1992); SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON, DEMAND-SIDE
MANAGEMENT: ANNUAL REPORT, 1991 RESULTS AND 1992 PLANS (1992); SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
EDISON, DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT: TECHNICAL APPENDIX, 1991 RESULTS (1992); WESTERN
MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY, APPLICATION FOR PRE-APPROVAL FOR CONSERVATION
AND L)AD MANAGEMENT PROGRAM COSTS AND RECOVERY (1992) (sources on file with the
authors).
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Table 2-A. Thirteen Incentive Mechanisms
All Programs Incentive Mechanism ($ million)
Region Shar ] Fixed
(Described in Terms Incentive Share Charge
Utility State Mechanism of Net Benefit) Cap' ). 4,
PG&E. 1991 CA Shared Savings $226 r NB 15% 0
$151 NB < $226 $53.0 0% 0
NB < $151 15% $15.0
Markup All Outcomes $2.6 5% 0
SDG&E, 1990-91 CA Shared Savings $12 s NB 33.5%' 0
NH < $12 40% $4.80
$5.0
Bonus All Outcomes Total 9% 0
Markup All Outcomes 5% 0
SCE. 1990 CA Variable Bonus $71 s NB 0% 04
NB < $71 none 17.6%' $20.14
Variable Markup 75% ENB NB' 5% 0
NB < 75% ENB none Variable 0
CHG&E. 1990-91 NY Shared Savings All Outcomes $.76 20% 0
NiMo, 1990-91 NY Shared Savings All Outcomes none 10% none
O&R, 1991 NY Shared Savings $6 5 NB $2.8 17.5%6 0
NB < S6 10% $.62
Mass Elec., 1992 MA Shared Savings7  $0 -- NB' 6.7% 0
NB < $0 none 100% 0
WMECO. 1990 MA Bonus $16 < NB 3.6%" $.58
NB < $16 none 0% 0
CMP, 1991 ME Shared Savings $10 < NB $2.7 7.5% $.80
$0 < NB<$10 To 0% 0
TotalNB < $0 10% 1 0
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Table 2-B. Thirteen Incentive Mechanisms with Normalized Values
All Programs Incentive Mechanism (S million)
Region T 1Fixed(Described in Terms Incentive Share Charge
Utility State Mechanism of Net Benefit) Cap, X 
PG&E. 1991 CA Shared Savings $32 < NB 15% 0
$21 < NB < $32 $7.4 0% 0
NB < $21 15% $2.15
Markup All Outcomes $0.4 5% 0
SDG&E, 1990-91 CA Shared Savings $8 S NB 33.5%' 0
NB < $8 40% $3.30$3.5
Bonus All Outcomes Total 9% 0
Markup All Outcomes 5% 0
SCE, 1990 CA Variable Bonus $10 5 NB 0% 0'
NB < $10 $0.0 17.6% 1 $2.91'
Variable Markup 75% ENB < NB' 5% 0
NB < 75% ENB none Variable 0
CHG&E, 1990-91 NY Shared Savings All Outcomes $1.3 20% 0
NiMo, 1990-91 NY Shared Savings All Outcomes none 10% 0
O&R. 1991 NY Shared Savings $13 S NB 17.5%' 0
NB < $13 $6.1 10% $1.40
Mass Elec., 1992 MA Shared Savings $0 S NB' 6.7% 0
NB < $0 none 100% 0
WMECO. 1990 MA Bonus' $42 < NB 3.6% $1.5
NB < $42 none 0% 0
CMP, 1991 ME Shared Savings $11 < NB 7.5% $0.90
$0NB <S11 $30 0% 0
NB < SO Total 10% 0
Conservation Incentives
Abbreviations: PG&E is Pacific Gas and Electric. SDG&E is San Diego Gas and Electric.
SCE is Southern California Edison. CHG&E is Central Hudson Gas and Electric. NiMo is Niagara
Mohawk Power Corporation. O&R is Orange and Rockland Utilities Inc. Mass Elec. is Massachu-
setts Electric. WMECO Western Massachusetts Electric Company. CMP is Central Maine Power.
The data for Table 2-B are taken from the following sources: BARAKAT & CHAMBERLIN,
INC., SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC, UTILITY DSM SHAREHOLDER INCENTIVE STUDY (1991);
CENTRAL HUDSON GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT: ANNUAL
EVALUATION FOR THE PERIOD 6/1/90-5/31/91 AND ESTIMATED RESULTS FOR THE PERIOD
6/1/91-5/31/92 (1991); CENTRAL MAINE POWER COMPANY, DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT
QUARTERLY REPORT (1991); MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY, DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT,
SUMMARY OF BUDGET, VALUE, KW AND KWh BY PROGRAM (1991); NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER
CORPORATION, 1990 ANNUAL EVALUATION REPORT: DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(1991); NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION, 1991 ANNUAL EVALUATION REPORT:
DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (1992); ORANGE AND ROCKLAND UTILITIES, INC.,
PROGRAM EVALUATION (1992); PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, ANNUAL SUMMARY
REPORT ON DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN 1990 AND 1991 (1992); PACIFIC GAS
AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, ANNUAL SUMMARY REPORT ON DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT
PROGRAMS IN 1991 AND 1992 (1992); PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, ANNUAL REPORT
ON DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN 1991 AND 1992: TECHNICAL APPENDIX (1992);
UNITED ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ENERGY ACTION '92 (1992); SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC
COMPANY, ANNUAL SUMMARY OF DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES (1992); SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA EDISON, DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT: ANNUAL REPORT, 1991 RESULTS AND 1992
PLANS (1992); SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON, DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT: TECHNICAL
APPENDIX, 1991 RESULTS (1992); WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY, APPLICATION
FOR PRE-APPROVAL FOR CONSERVATION AND LOAD MANAGEMENT PROGRAM COSTS AND
RECOVERY (1992) (unpublished manuscripts, on file with the author).
Notes to Tables 2-A and 2-B
1. All programs also have expenditure caps.
2. The high share value is compensated for by an artificially low value for avoided cost.
See text for explanation.
3. The share value derived from holding program costs fixed. The tax markup factor was
excluded for analytical simplicity.
4. The fixed charge is calculated with the assumption that rate of return is equal to the
utility's cost of capital.
5. The expected Net Benefits (ENB) and Net Benefits (NB) are based on number of units
installed.
6. The incentive can range from a ninety basis point upward adjustment of ROE to a
downward adjustment of twenty basis points. A change in one basis point equals approximately
a $30,800 change in ROE. The exact amount of incentive depends on the combination of energy
and resource savings achieved. According to Barakat and Chamberlin, the maximum potential
incentive is 17.5% of net resource savings.
7. The Massachusetts Electric Company is the only utility in this table that does not
provide a lost-revenue recovery mechanism. Consequently, there is an implicit bonus mechanism
being subtracted from the explicit shared-savings mechanism reported here. We are currently
unable to determine the strength of this negative incentive component.
8. In the neighborhood of NB=0, the incentives vary slightly from those listed here, but
the differences are slight enough that they do not significantly alter the structure of the incentive.
9. The net benefit for this bonus program is calculated as the difference between the
avoided cost value of threshold energy and capacity savings and program expenditures. If the
utility does not achieve the threshold savings levels, it is not eligible to earn an incentive.
10. For WMECO, we calculated the marginal share (?L) by estimating the corresponding
increase in the incentive given a one dollar increase in avoided costs.
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Table 3. Program Expenditures and Definitions of Net Benefit
All Programs Included in Net Benefit?
Normalized Utility
Utility Transfers
Expenditure to Customer Evaluation When
Utility Program (S million) Customers Costs Costs Measured
PG&E Shared Savings $9.98 Yes No No Ex Ante
Markup $7.70 NA NA NA NA
SDG&E Shared Savings $12.44 No Yes No Ex Ante
Bonus' $0.39 No Yes No NYA
Markup' $3.19 No Yes No NYA
SCE Variable Bonus2  $8.54 Yes No No Ex Ante
Variable Markup2  $4.43 Yes No NYA NYA
CHG&E Shared Savings $19.28 Yes No Yes Ex Post
NiMo Shared Savings $12.95 No Yes Yes Ex Post
O&R Shared Savings $20.43 Yes No Yes Ex Ante
Mass. Elec. Shared Savings $49.21) No Yes Yes Ex Post
WMECo. Bonust $40.21 No Yes Yes Ex Post
CMIP Shared Savings $20.94 No Yes Yes Ex Post
Table 3 is drawn from the same sources as Table 1.
Notes to Table 3
1. The net benefit always includes avoided cost and direct program expenditures, but may
or may not include the three items examined here: transfers, unreimbursed customer costs, and
program evaluation costs.
2. Many utilities compute net benefit even though it is not used as part of the incentive
calculation.
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Table 4-A. Cost and Savings
Shared-Savings and Bonus Avoided Costs Lifetime Savings
Programs in 1992 (1991 Programs) Total
S/kWh SkW-yr PDV
Avoided
On Off Env. Avg. Costs
Utility Mechanism Peak peak Adder I Total Capacity GWh MW-yr ($ M)
PG&E Shared Savings .035 .030 .000 .032 42.12 7,241 1,453.0 426.5
SDG&E Shared Savings .040 .030 .000 .033 81.54 985 17.2 48.2
Bonus .040 .030 000 .033 81.54 137 3.2 1.3
SCE Variable Bonus .041 .031 .000 .034 96.90 2,664 1306.7 183.4
CHG&E Shared Savings .048 .048 .015 .063 26.28 376 35.5 23.4
NiMo Shared Savings NA NA .016 .050 0.00 2.000 NA 100.0
O&R Shared Savings .027 .027 .014 .041 16.64 NYA NYA NYA
Mass. E. Shared Savings NA NA 040 .091 31.32 1,573 654.7 130.4
WMECo. Bonus NA NA .040 .092 41.48 708 228.9 6.71
CMPI Shared Savings .046 .023 .000 .030 69.26 409 8.0 32.0
NA = Not Available NYA = Not Yet Available
Note to Table 4-A
This table is based on both a 37.6 GWh reported annual energy savings over a ten-year
program lifetime and a 200 GWh average annual savings over an assumed average ten-year
program lifetime.
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Table 4-B. Total Savings: Normalized
Shared-Savings & Bonus Nonnalized




Utility Mechanism GWh MW (S million) (S million)
PG&E Shared Savings 1,130 206 62.09 62.09
SDG&E Shared Savings 684 12 33.33 33.33
Bonus 95 2 .88 .88
SCE Variable Bonus 386 189 26.54 26.54
CHG&E Shared Savings 671 63 41.79 31.75
NiMo I Shared Savings 579 0. 31.15 23.38
O&R Shared Savings NYA NYA NYA NYA
Mass. Elec. Shared Savings 1.ll14 422 83.13 55.85
WMECo. Bonus 1.863 6)2 176.54 123.13
CMP Shared Savings 449 9 35.20 35.20
NYA = Not Yet Available
Normalization adjusts for variations in utility size measured in TWh/year. This table is
drawn from the same sources as Table I.
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Table 5. Normalized Incentives
Shared-Savings and
-Bonus Programs Net Benefit Incentive Incentive per $ Saved'
With Without
Utility Mechanism (S million) (S million) Envir. Adder Envir. Adder
PG&E Shared Savings 52.63 7.89 .127 .127
SDG&E Shared Savings 24.47 3.36 .101 .101
Bonus .89 .08 .090 .090
SCE Variable Bonus 17.95 .71 .026 .026
CHG&E Shared Savings 24.70 5.12 .122 .160
NiMo Shared Savings 23.32 2.33 .075 .110
O&R Shared Savings NYA NYA NYA NYA
Mass. Elee. Shared Savings 43.90 1.41 .017 .025
WMECo. Bonus 130.80 3.19 .018 .026
CMP Shared Savings 14.26 1.07 .030 .030
NYA = Not Yet Available
This table is drawn from the same sources as Table 1.
Note to Table 5
The incentive rate is calculated as the incentive payment divided by total savings.
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Appendix B
An Analysis of Four Actual Incentive Mechanisms
The first set of mechanisms examined in this Appendix demonstrates the
unnecessary complexity of many incentives currently in use. A second set of
mechanisms that have been complicated to the point at which they no longer
fit the classification scheme of this Article, show no apparent economic justifi-
cation.
Pacific Gas and Electric's (PG&E) and San Diego Gas and Electric's
(SDG&E) shared-savings programs both suffer from needless complexity.
PG&E has adopted a nonlinear approach that results in a wildly fluctuating
marginal incentive. SDG&E has adopted a complex formula thai seems to
promise subtle motivational benefits but under the application of elementary
algebra can be seen to reduce to the standard shared-savings formula with a
strangely low value for avoided cost.
The 1991 shared-savings mechanism of PG&E makes the incentive
payment a nonlinear function of net benefit. The incentive payment jumps from
zero to about $34 million when net benefit reaches 75% of "expected net
benefit" (ENB). There is no incentive payment between 50% and 75% of ENB.
Below 50% of ENB, PG&E must pay a penalty equal to .1 5(NB - .5ENB). The
penalty region and the normal region above 75% of ENB have
the same X, and in the middle dead band region the incentive vanishes. At the
right end of the dead band, the marginal incentive jumps from zero to infinity
which does not result in overly high payments but does create extraordinarily
large incentives for crossing the 75% boundary. A rationale for such changes
in the incentive level is hard to imagine.'
In the 1990-91 SDG&E's mechanism, incentives are calculated differently
according to whether net benefit exceeds or falls short of a minimum perfor-
mance target (MPT). When net benefit is below MPT the mechanism is
I = 0.4 NB - 0.4 MPT,
which clearly fits the definition of a shared-savings mechanism with 4) defined
as O.4MPT. However, at higher levels of net benefit the SDG&E mechanism
is most directly represented by the following formula:
I = 0.135NB + 0.2Q(OTC - G/Q)
The first component is a standard shared-savings incentive, but the second
part's inclusion of "original target cost,"' OTC, program costs, G, and con-
7. Experience with expenditures on conservation incentive programs shows that the utility is far more
likely to be the normal region than in the dead band or penalty region.
8. SDG&E calculates the second component of this formula using first year energy savings. However,
using lifetime savings in lieu of first year savings yields identical results. Here we apply lifetime savings
in both components of the incentive formula for analytical simplicity.
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served energy, Q, appears to introduce a whole new type of incentive. However,
with the application of simple algebra this equation can be rewritten as
I = 0.335(dQ - G),
which is just ordinary shared savings with a zero fixed charge, (IJ, and an
unusually low value for the avoided cost of conserved energy, a. The value
used is a weighted average of the avoided cost and the original target cost, with
the weights chosen to favor the OTC.9 In summary, this mechanism collapses
to a shared-savings formula, except that conserved energy is, in most cases,
compensated at an atypically low rate.
Two of the utility programs summarized in Appendix A use incentive
mechanisms that do not fit any of the three categories described in this Article.
The mechanisms are presented here to illustrate the random diversity that
characterizes this area of regulation. Neither mechanism provides a useful
improvement over the current standard mechanisms.
Orange and Rockland (O&R) is the first example of a mechanism that
does not fit within our classification scheme. Its 1991 incentive formula is
discontinuous at Q,, 40% of the utility's energy savings goal. For savings
below this level, the mechanism is a pure bonus scheme, although the payment
is negative. For higher values of savings, the incentive is a hybrid bonus/shared-
savings formula. In this region, the incentive is proportional to the product of
net benefit and saved energy, and is represented algebraically by the following
equation:
I = )XQ(aQ - G)
This is simply the first term in the shared-savings formula multiplied by
Q, conserved energy. This mechanism makes the incentive payment depend on
the square of saved energy. Consequently, the incentive function is nonlinear.
and becomes steeper as energy savings increase. Since it is steepness that
provides motivation, motivation increases with energy saved. It is not clear that
this is desirable, but the mechanism is different.
The 1990 Southern California Edison incentive plan provides another
exception to our classification. The mechanism is represented in its simplest
form below:
I = (XQ - 2 )G
Q is energy saved and G is program expenditure. A notable feature of this
incentive is that its maximum is zero. The maximum is paid whenever savings
9. The value of a is given by (13.5(a) + 20 OTC)/33.5, where (a) is a best estimate of San Diego's
avoided cost equal to about 4.5 0/kWh, and OTC ranges from about 0.4 c/kWh to 5.4 C/Kwh depending
on the program.
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are at least 75% of the target level. Below that level, the above formula takes
effect. Although an incentive with no upside is unusual, this particular feature
does not violate our classification scheme. The violation results from the
incentive being partly based on the product of savings and costs. °
10. The Edison program allows the company to include its expenditures in the rate base. This
inclusion may provide a positive incentive if the allowed rate of return exceeds the cost of capital and
if the company achieves a sufficiently high percentage of its target savings.
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